OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

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LAKE OPERATIONAL AREA

Lake County Emergency Operations Plan

Energy Shortage Annex

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I. Energy Shortage

General

This Annex is intended to address the basic questions of how the Lake County Sheriff's Office and Operational Area intend to respond to Countywide or localized energy outages or shortages. Due to the potentially widespread, yet uncertain, nature of these events, coupled with the unknown effects of infrastructure interdependencies, it is recommended that we attempt address all possible impacts on public safety and continuity of government operations. For this reason, it is important to describe the operating concepts, policies, and management direction for implementing the County Emergency Plan and Standard Operating Procedures.

Lake County responds to emergencies and disasters using the Incident Command System (ICS) and Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). SEMS consists of several levels which are activated, as necessary, starting at the field response level and then gradually increasing as more resources or assistance are necessary to the local government Emergency Operations Center (EOC) level, the operational area (county) level, the regional EOC level, and finally to the state EOC level. This "bottom up" system supports the responsibility of local government to protect their citizens while permitting "top down" sharing of resources, alerts, warnings and intelligence.

II. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to address special considerations posed by Energy Shortages and associated issues. This Annex is not meant to supplant existing plans and procedures, but to strengthen existing capabilities for responding to countywide Energy shortages. This document will be used in conjunction with the State's Emergency Energy Shortage Response Plan which further describes the structure and role of the County's Emergency Management Organization during an energy shortage, and ensures effective interagency coordination in accordance with the County's Emergency Plan and the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).

III. Objectives

The overall objectives of emergency energy operations will be to:

1. Establish a proactive Operational Area approach to the energy emergency that includes all affected jurisdictions in the county.
2. Utilize the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) in managing all phases of this plan. This includes establishment of policy and inter-agency coordination group(s) (IACG) when needed.
3. Aggressively monitor the progress of the energy emergency.
4. Maintain contact and liaison with energy supply providers.
5. Assist in procuring and distributing essential energy resources to support emergency operations.
6. Monitor the distribution of essential energy supplies.
7. As required, coordinate energy suppliers to prioritize and support emergency restoration of disrupted services.

8. Provide liaison with all levels of government according to the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) in order to provide an organized systems approach to emergency energy operations.
9. Provide accurate and timely information for dissemination to the public.
10. Maintain energy supplies to support medical, transportation, water, electrical, sanitation, and other key and essential systems and services.
11. Work in unison with the California Energy Shortage Contingency Plan.
12. Monitor the potential/actual need for economic assistance programs to assist low-income households.

IV. Background and Scope

The emergency management community is concerned with both short-term power outage consequences as well as longer-term impacts. Security and safety issues at large venues and retail establishments, for example, present short-term concerns. Longer-term impacts can be anticipated if disruptions continuously occur in utility, transportation, health care, communications systems and commerce.

As a result of this situation, OES and other agencies responsible for disaster preparedness, response, and recovery must focus on two areas: 1) promoting preparedness by individuals in both the public and private sectors, and 2) planning specifically for potential energy shortages & power outages.

1. Power Outages as Part of Disaster Planning and Response

Specific to the energy crisis will be the perception or reality of scarce resources available for use in assisting local governments. In this sense OES' State Operations Center (SOC), the three administrative regions, and the law/fire mutual aid systems may be put through the most strenuous test since the inception of SEMS. Effective communication and prioritization of resources will be key challenges for the Regional Emergency Operations Centers (REOCs) and SOC in such an environment.

Also important to the energy crisis will be the need for insightful intelligence from state, regional and local sources to describe the effects of power loss throughout the State. Local governments will require this information to prepare themselves for impacts that could occur within their jurisdictions. Dissemination of this information will represent a paradigm shift in the way incident information is shared within California. Traditional "bottom up" collection of information during the energy crisis will have to effectively coexist with a simultaneous "top down" provision of useful intelligence.

OES has a continuing role in disaster preparedness efforts, developing focused guidance and materials; giving local presentations; coordinating mutual aid discussions; assisting local agencies in their preparedness activities; and planning and participating in exercises. The County continues to train and exercise response functions, ensuring a high level of operational readiness throughout the agencies. Even with the unknowns surrounding the energy crisis, OES and the County of Lake will be ready to respond.

2. Situational Analysis and Forecast

Lake County's primary energy source is electrical, provided by and through Pacific Gas & Electric's distribution network. There is no natural gas service to the County. The majority of residents in the County use LPG (propane). Some residents use fuel oil to heat their homes.

The only current power generation source is the Geysers Complex, operated by multiple companies that feed power to the regional grid. Of note, the complex currently enhances its' steam generation by pumping waste water into the earth.

Most power is distributed via cable strung from poles, and propane is via on-site tanks refilled by tank truck.

3. Variables

The Energy Commission estimates that 30% of electrical use during summer months is for air conditioning. An extreme heat wave during any of the summer months could stretch the system. If there are unplanned generation or transmission disruptions, outages could result. High winds have also brought down distribution and transmission poles and towers. This can bring local or wider scale outages.

Another variable is the effect of the drought in the Pacific Northwest. This area of the United States received lower than usual rainfall during the winter, and officials in that area will be making decisions as to water storage vs. the use of that water for hydroelectric generation.

California buys this hydroelectric power on a frequent basis, and a deficiency in this source means one less resource is available when needed.

Conservation is still vital. California's residents and businesses have already made great strides in this area, but every additional effort is important. The California Department of General Services has taken the lead on developing best practices for conservation in government buildings, as it is important to lead by example. Local governments should consider adopting similar practices. The more we conserve, the lower the probability of outages – and the lower our utility bills.

Fire can always affect the electrical generation and transmission system. Some of the long distance transmission lines in California and in adjacent states are in areas of vegetation, and as such can be damaged during forest or brush fires. Use of fire retardants can affect the transmission lines capacity, and such considerations may come into play when developing fire suppression plans.

Lines or generating plants are somewhat susceptible to sabotage, however it is important to note that there is absolutely no intelligence information that would suggest such activity is any more likely during this time.

4. Issues

In a meeting with representatives of California's Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Regions, the

California State Sheriff's Association, the California Police Chief's Association and the California Highway Patrol, consensus was reached that to date; no significant rise in criminal activity can be attributable to the rotating outages experienced so far.

There have been increased calls for service and activity during the outages. Communications centers are immediately flooded with inquiries about the outage and from calls reporting traffic signal failures. Call for service increases seem to be limited to traffic collisions and hazards, false alarm calls and medical emergencies.

5. Infrastructure Interdependencies

Even more critical and less apparent are the somewhat obscure interrelationships or interdependencies among the various "infrastructures". Infrastructure" put into context means more than the obvious definition implies. In this case, it means all the usual types such as electric power, natural gas/oil, telecommunications, transportation, water/sewer systems, banking/finance, agriculture, emergency, and government services.

The other type of "infrastructures" that might be affected and are of a non-standard variety and could include lifeline support of home-bound persons, homeless shelters and their support systems, mail delivery, bus service, school systems, recreational outlets and tourism among others.

Several types of interdependencies can occur: physical, cyber, logical, and geographic. While this may be different in nature, one thing they all have in common is disruption of the norm for any given infrastructure. With the "cascade effect", that translates into disruptions in areas or other infrastructures" that may not even be closely related.

Electric power has come to be taken for granted and as such, a large amount of daily life depends on the adequate supply of that power. We have grown to expect that power will always be available and when it is not, a series of cascading events occur that affects virtually every part of normal life.

A negative effect on critical infrastructures such as the electrical supply system has potentially serious cascading ramifications into other critical areas that eventually affect the very basics of normal life. The homebound person on a ventilator, totally dependent on a number of critical infrastructures may best exemplify this. The obvious one is the continuous power source needed to run the ventilator. The less obvious ones might be the telephone system needed to summon help, or the transportation system needed to take the person elsewhere or the water system needed to maintain sanitary conditions. The failure of any one would put them at severe risk.

6. Scenarios

Based on the information available to date, if demand exceeds supply during the summer months, rotating outages may occur. Rolling outages generally last for one to two hours per area (electrical service "block"). If the deficiency exists over a protracted period, the outages could move from area to area on a frequent basis until the demand drops or the supply increases. As such, a local law enforcement agency could see outages "hop" between areas in the community on a continuous basis for one or more hours each, over a period of many hours. At this point there is no reason to believe the outages will last any longer than the "standard" one to two hours per block, nor should they extend into nighttime hours. However, they could become more frequent.

Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), along with the other public and private electrical utilities have been required to mitigate the potential of fires caused by electrical transmission and distribution equipment. In addition to vegetation removal and reduction, and (eventually) under-grounding of lines, the utilities may cut off power to areas determined to be at high risk for utility-caused fires. These outages may last for a few hours to a few days. The utilities are required to provide 72 hours notice to government officials, and at least 48 hours notice to customers. In addition, special needs customers are individually contacted, and provided support. Community Resources Centers (CRC's) are also established to enable residents to charge critical equipment, and take refuge from foul weather. PG&E has also initiated grants and other means to support agencies, jurisdictions and customers in developing alternate sources of power.

There are also two "worst case" scenarios worth consideration. They are highly unlikely, but contingency planning should take them into account. Both of these were of concern long before the current electrical energy emergency. The first is the possibility of a large-scale "cascading" power failure on a regional and/or multi-state basis. Again, though this is highly unlikely, unchecked imbalance in the electrical grid can cause problems that take much longer to alleviate. Utilities must re-start generation and transmission from a "black start" condition which takes hours. The greater the percentage of the grid that goes out, the longer it takes to resume operations. Outages could last from a few hours to a day – longer in some areas. There is no reason to believe this is any more likely at this time than in the past or near-term future.

Another "worst case" can occur with or without power outages – heat emergency. In Chicago during the summer of 1995 a protracted period of extreme heat in an urban area caused in excess of 500 deaths. This was not related to a power failure. Several years later, Dallas suffered a similar problem. OES, working with the Department of Health Services and the Emergency Medical Services Authority, is developing "best practices" information on this topic.

V. (CAISO) Alerts

This following is intended to provide information on the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) Alerts, Warnings, and Emergency Stages and to provide guidelines for the County of Lake to use in the event of a CAISO Stage 3 Emergency.

As a note, due to the nature of a CAISO Stage 3 Emergency, the County may not receive prior notification of the actual declaration and the possibility of resulting rolling blackouts. However, if advanced notification is given the notification procedures in this document may be helpful in giving prior notice to some agencies. This document is to serve as a guideline only. Depending on the amount of information available, e.g. timing, area(s) affected, and duration of outage the notification procedures in this document may need to be modified. If there is an outage of which notification to County OES is delayed, these procedures may not need to be used at all, especially if it is expected that the outage is short-term.

During a Stage 3 Emergency Declaration CAISO sends an alert to all electrical market participants, appropriate state regulatory, oversight, and response agencies. The information is then broadcast to the general public through a coordinated effort between the CAISO and utilities. As a result of this, many entities and the public may quickly become aware of the situation and notification by the County may not be necessary. However, each County Department should still consider following up with key agencies as suggested in your department's emergency plan.

If, prior to a Stage 3 Emergency, outage information cannot be obtained, communications should occur between the County and Edison, in an attempt to determine the affected area(s) and estimated duration of power outage.

1. Background of CAISO

When California changed its electric power distribution system, the State Legislature created the quasi-governmental California Independent System Operator (CAISO). One of the duties of the CAISO is to ensure that all demand for power is met, and also to provide for adequate reserves.

Electricity is made, distributed, and used in real time and cannot be stored, therefore supply is always being produced to meet demand. California is part of a grid interconnected within the Western US Region and participates in the voluntary Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC). The WSCC coordinates the activities and establishes the reserve requirements for the entire Western US Region.

Growth and the lack of power generation facilities have made the State's power system more vulnerable to supply shortages.

2. Summary of CAISO Alerts, Warnings, and Emergency Stages

Alerts, Warnings, and Emergency Stages may be declared by the CAISO when a shortfall of electrical operating reserve or some other marginal operational condition is forecast to occur. The timing and severity of the forecasted shortfall is determines whether an Alert, Warning, or Emergency is declared. To clearly indicate severity of the power shortage "Emergency" is classified in three (3) stages, whereas there are no stages for Alerts or Warnings.

Alerts and Warnings are declared as a requirement for operation of the energy market mechanisms and are distributed among market participants only. Although, during the Warning phase courtesy notifications may be given to State OES, the Electrical Oversight Board, the Energy Commission, and the Public Utilities Commission.

An Emergency must be declared for more severe circumstances. When an Emergency is declared, that information is communicated to the general public by CAISO.

Summary descriptions of Alerts, Warnings, and Emergency Stages are shown in the following section.

a) Alert Declaration

An Alert declaration is made any time there is a forecasted shortfall of operating reserves of less than 7% or other marginal operational conditions, which are anticipated to occur in the next day. The Alert declaration is sent to market participants in an effort to stimulate electricity sources to provide more resources. The Alert declaration is also sent to CAISO Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs) and is forwarded by the PTOs to Utility Distribution Companies (UDCs) within their respective areas.

b) Warning Declaration

A Warning declaration is made as early as 2200 hours on the day before the forecasted

shortfall (such as operating reserves less than 7%) is anticipated to occur. The Warning can also come sooner if available generating resources necessary to meet the forecasted shortfall is to be relieved by acquiring energy from a steam generating unit that requires 36 hours for a full start up. In that case, a Warning may be issued 36 hours in advance of the shortfall.

As in an Alert, the Warning declaration is sent to market participants in an effort to stimulate the market to provide more resources. For reliability purposes, the Warning declaration also enables the CAISO to seek additional resources, which may be available outside of the normal market structure. The Warning declaration is also sent to CAISO PTOs and is forwarded by their PTOs to UDCs within their respective areas.

At the Warning level, courtesy notifications may be given to State OES, the Electricity Oversight Board, the Energy Commission, and the Public Utilities Commission.

3. Emergency Stages

Stage 1 Emergency

A Stage 1 Emergency may be declared at any time it is clear that an operating reserve shortfall (such as less than 7%) is unavoidable, or is forecast to occur within the next two hours.

The severity of the Stage 1 Emergency is less than Stage 2 or 3 and indicates that the operating reserve is forecast to be below minimum criteria, but not so far below as to require interruption of service to consumers.

The Stage 1 Emergency declaration is sent to all market participants, to appropriate state regulatory, oversight, and response agencies, and is broadcast to the general public in a coordinated effort between the ISO and UDCs. Consumers are requested to voluntarily reduce their consumption of electric energy in order to avoid more severe conditions including involuntary curtailments.

Stage 2 Emergency

A Stage 2 Emergency may be declared at any time it is clear that an operating reserve shortfall of less than 5% is unavoidable, or is forecast to occur within the next two hours. The severity of a the Stage 2 Emergency is less than Stage 3 and indicates that the operating reserve is forecast to be below minimum criteria and at a level where significant intervention is required by the CAISO. At this level, interruption of service to selected consumers is required in order to avoid more severe conditions. Selected consumers are electricity customers who have agreed to be interrupted if a Stage 2 Emergency is declared. These customers receive a reduced rate for their electricity service as compensation for their willingness to be curtailed. The County of Lake participates in the Interruptible Rate Program.

The Stage 2 Emergency declaration is sent to all market participants, to appropriate state regulatory, oversight, and response agencies, and is broadcast to the general public in a coordinated effort between the CAISO and UDCs. Consumers are requested to voluntarily reduce their consumption of electric energy in order to avoid more severe conditions including involuntary curtailments.

Stage 3 Emergency

A Stage 3 Emergency may be declared at any time it is clear that an operating reserve shortfall of less than 1½% is unavoidable, or is forecast to occur within the next two hours. A Stage 3

Emergency is the most severe category and indicates that, without significant CAISO intervention, the electric system is in danger of imminent collapse. Involuntary curtailment of service to consumers (such as "rolling blackouts") may occur during a Stage 3 Emergency.

The Stage 3 Emergency declaration is sent to all market participants, to appropriate state regulatory, oversight, and response agencies, and is broadcast to the general public in a coordinated effort between the CAISO and UDCs. Consumers are advised that involuntary interruptions of service have begun and will be continued until the emergency has passed. Consumers are requested to reduce their consumption of electric energy wherever possible to avoid more severe involuntary curtailments.

VI. EOC Activation

Many State, Regional and local governments (including the County of Lake if necessary) will be activating their Emergency Operations Centers in response to widespread power outages. To support local County Agencies, Cities and Departments, and as required by SEMS, OES would activate the EOC according to the following schedule:

1. **Initial EOC activation** will be partial with minimum staff (as needed) escalating to full (24 hours) with staff working 12-hour shifts. At a minimum, Sheriff's OES will continue to maintain an enhanced Duty Officer status whenever CAISO issues a "Level 3".

The on-site staffing at the EOC is anticipated to cover consecutive 12-hour shifts. Shift changes will occur at 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. depending on conditions and need.

While Pacific Gas & Electric has committed to notifying all jurisdictions of a definite time of occurrence, the potential impact may consist of incidents limited in terms of reach and duration to an impact that is widespread and sustained. To address staffing issues for the worst-case scenario, all EOC assigned County employees, whether or not they work in positions generally activated at the EOC, must recognize that it is vital that a large majority of them be available to respond. Therefore, each department must ensure that enough employees are available to respond during the critical time period. As a result, it is likely that County Departments will not be able to approve all of the vacations and leave requested during emergency incidents. County Department managers have been tasked to determine adequate staffing levels and reserves for emergency response in support of the EOC. Accordingly, managers will work with employees to ensure sufficient staff is on hand or available for immediate recall and deployment during this period of time and to provide for a rested reserve that can support sustained operations. This includes placing staff on standby, limiting the number of staff on vacation, and minimum scheduling of vacations around those dates.

2. Staffing Requirements for the EOC

Staffing for EOC activation due to a power outage incident will be consistent with staffing practices during previous disasters. Prior to activation each functional group will submit draft-staffing plans that call for personnel by SEMS position. Such plans are reviewed on a regular basis by Sheriff's OES staff and position call-out lists will be maintained. Activation requests for EOC staff and additional County agency representatives are sent to the County Agencies at the request of the Sheriff or his designated representative.

An analysis of projected staffing needs for the activated EOC during power outages cannot be estimated at this time. Sheriff's OES must make plans to provide continuous, effective staffing for

the duration of this and any other activation. Therefore, County Departments with emergency response roles will need to be prepared to complete a staffing plan outlining anticipated personnel needs for any activation. From these plans Sheriff's OES will analyze agency-wide needs and project forward staffing expectations and strategies for all departments. This information will allow managers to approve what vacations they can; in a manner they may choose, while still ensuring adequate staff to support the EOC.

3. Pre-Emergency Period

The five phases of readiness conditions that apply to County emergency operations prior to activation are preparedness, increased readiness, pre-impact, immediate impact, and sustained emergency. These phases are described progressively. Commencement of these phases will be made by the Director of Disaster Services in consultation with Managers for their departments in response to conditions within the County, or in order to respond in support of local agencies, non-profit services providers, other EOCs, or other agencies as needed either prior to or after the activation period.

The Pre-Emergency Period is divided into two phases as follows:

a) Normal Preparedness Phase: During this phase, emphasis will be placed on preparing supporting plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and checklists dealing with the use of energy resources during an emergency. Such plans and procedures will provide for coordination and communication channels with governmental agencies and elements of the private sector that normally provide energy services. The normal preparedness phase corresponds to the Energy Commission's Readiness response.

   This phase reflects normal status of planning, training, and exercising. As part of our participation in the Interruptible Rate Program, we are currently experiencing blackouts at selected County sites. However, it is widely accepted that there is potential for various system failures that could result in infrastructure disruptions at a local and statewide level. Due to the level of concern over these potential disruptions and public reaction to real events associated with the energy crisis, OES is taking/will take the following actions:

   i. Review and, as required, enhance Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs), phone rosters, and interagency procedures.
   ii. Evaluate and test all of the above to ensure they work as designed.
   iii. Inventory and test communications, equipment, and consumable supplies; repair, enhance, and purchase equipment as necessary.
   iv. Develop initial EOC staffing patterns.
   v. Reevaluate emergency notification procedures and checklists.
   vi. Plan and carry out exercises to test the plans.

b) Increased Readiness Phase: This phase could begin due to various conditions such as severe electric power shortages. Increased readiness actions will include reviewing and updating plans, SOPs, and resource information, and assuring that key and essential personnel, facilities, and equipment are operationally ready and have sufficient fuel available and in reserve for emergency use. Formation of Operational Area Policy/

Interagency coordination group(s) should be considered. Activation of the Operational Area Emergency Operations Center at the appropriate level is also a consideration.

During the increased readiness phase, the Energy Commission begins its Verification Phases during which the magnitude and duration of an energy shortage are estimated and various options for a statewide response are studied.

This phase will be initiated when the Director of Disaster Services, in consultation with the State and Operational Area determine that, based upon intelligence, a greater likelihood of threat may exist. Examples of these threats may include:

i. Analysis of lessons learned from statewide exercises & drills (hospital and utilities).
ii. Potential civil disturbance.
iii. "Runs" on banks, markets, gas stations etc.
iv. Events in other cities or other areas outside the County, which may have significant media or economic impacts on Lake County.

During the increased readiness phase the following steps are required:

i. Poll local agencies to ascertain potential impacts and/or potential resource requests.
ii. Confirm 24-hour phone numbers and points of contact for agencies that staff the EOC.
iii. Reevaluate initial staffing patterns and determine staff needs and availability.
iv. Develop a staff recall roster for off-hour recall.
v. Ensure all staff review SOPs.
vi. Determine standby time frames for staff.
vii. Test, repair, and purchase equipment as necessary.
viii. Complete all activities pending from the previous phase.
ix. Identify potential needs from analysis of situation reports.
x. Develop ad hoc contingency plans for perceived needs.
xi. Share relevant alerts and warnings and intelligence reports with local governments and the Operational Area and in accordance with OES media strategy.

In general, outages of 60-90 minutes are not a major concern. Vital functions would be continued, in some cases at a slightly reduced level. Some communications (primarily local, privately owned) telephone switches would be impacted. The major concern associated with longer outages (4-6 hours or more) is that water purveyors' ability to refill reservoirs would be impacted; and hence reduce water supplies available for fire-fighting and other large quantity customers.

4. Emergency Period

The Emergency Period is divided into three phases as follows:

a) Pre-Impact Phase: Most actions to be accomplished during this phase are precautionary in nature and centered around taking appropriate countermeasures to protect people should a major earthquake, other types of energy shortages, or other disaster affect the jurisdiction. If an energy shortage is imminent, the Operational Area leadership should prepare to estimate and publicize what the countywide effect is likely to be. If, for example, a major emergency is imminent and an evacuation probable, buses, automobiles, and other transportation should be coordinated at the Operational Area level. Energy resources must then also be organized to support a continuous delivery of supplies to sustain remaining and evacuated populations.

   During the pre-impact phase, the Energy Commission continues its Verification phase and makes public its estimates of the magnitude and duration of the energy shortage. If appropriate, the Commission also explains what actions it will take and what recommendations it intends to make to the Governor. During this time, communication between the Operational Area leadership and potentially affected jurisdictions/agencies/organizations within the county are essential. Information exchanges with State Office of Emergency Services (OES) Coastal Region is also vital to maintaining a rapid response posture. The Operational Area Public Information effort regarding the local situation is a very necessary element in maintaining public confidence that the situation is being dealt with in a proactive, organized manner.

b) Immediate Impact Phase: Actions taken during this phase will be concentrated on the well being of people affected by an event. Examples of such events might be a major earthquake causing supply disruption, or ceasing of shipments from a major overseas supplier.

   A causative event: such as a major earthquake that creates energy disruptions will result in a more complex response since two "disasters" will have to be managed. The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) will accommodate the response to both, as modifications to the system can be made quickly.

The Director of Disaster Services, in consultation with the State and adjacent Operational Areas will determine, based upon information from such sources as State OES, Pacific Gas & Electric, PUC, or other credible sources, if there have been occurrences in other parts of the State due to power outages or attributed to it that pose a significant impact on Lake County.

Possible triggering events might include:

i. Major power outages, for any reason.
ii. Nuclear power plant accidents for any reason.
iii. Terrorist acts or acts of unknown origin or suspicious cause that appear to be terrorism (anywhere).
iv. Major local gatherings or events that have or may lead to civil disturbances.
v. Major hazardous materials releases.
vi. Major wildland fires with transmission line involvement.

During the alert/warning phase the following steps are required:

i. Bring key staff to standby, cancel travel and vacations if necessary, to ensure proper staffing levels are available.
ii. Evaluate potential staffing patterns; advise the EOC Director that backup staff may be needed.
iii. Communicate with local neighboring governments regarding status.
iv. Complete all activities pending from previous phase.
v. Implement OES media strategy.

Priority activities will include restoring key and essential energy services and assessing any damage to or dislocation of the energy distribution networks.

During the immediate impact phase, the Energy Commission initiates its Pre-Emergency phase to an energy shortage. Voluntary programs such as ridesharing and flexible work schedules are begun with the commission acting as a central clearinghouse for all information regarding the effectiveness of programs.

c) Sustained Emergency Phase: As protective actions continue, attention can be given to sustaining populations in the affected areas. Energy must be supplied to support the delivery of essential equipment, services, and other resources. If an energy shortage worsens, the Energy Commission may begin its Emergency phase, and the Governor may, after proclaiming a State of Emergency, implement mandatory energy conservation programs

5. Post-Emergency Period (Recovery)

Priorities during this period will be focused on continuing to provide key and essential energy services and assisting in recovery operations. Various assistance programs may be available to help mitigate economic hardships to low-income households in the event of a serious energy supply disruption. The California Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO) will administer these programs, with the assistance of an Inter-Agency Task Force representing various agencies involved in economic assistance programs and the Energy Commission.

6. Public Information

The amount and type of media interest and coverage of an energy crisis will undoubtedly influence public information during any power outages. An expanded need for public information and public information officers (PIOs) can be expected. The Sheriff ‘s PIO will develop a strategy and appropriate procedures to ensure the provision of emergency public information during periods of alerts/warning including activation of the Emergency Notification Systems and coordination with other local and utility PIOs.

Public information in the County will follow protocols for dealing with the media. PIO activities will be coordinated through the lead PIO in the EOC. All contacts that are handled by the EOC staff will be noted on the PIO duty log.

7. Advance Warning Information Coordination

The state of California and the PUC are working with Pacific Gas & Electric to develop early warning systems that will allow for intelligence to be funneled into California's response system. State OES will disseminate this information from the SOC to the Operational Areas. The Operational Areas (OAs) will in turn disseminate the information to the local government EOCs.

Additionally, several new systems have been made available to expedite the transmission of energy status messages to both emergency managers and the general public. E-mail notifications are issued by the California Energy Commission and State OES. The California Energy Commission has developed an automated calling system that provides a telephone voice message reflecting the current warning in effect. Sheriff's OES receives notification via telephone, E-mail and cell phone from multiple sources, and relays this information as necessary.

The Sheriff's Office of Emergency Services in conjunction with the activation of the EOC will conduct the following activities:

a) Monitor the progress of the energy emergency and obtain information from the California Energy Commission via established communication lines.
b) Prepare an analysis of the probable effects.
c) Maintain contact and liaison with energy providers.
d) Assist in procuring and distributing essential energy resources to support emergency operations by applying to the Petroleum Fuels Set-Aside Program if appropriate.
e) Monitor the distribution of essential energy supplies.
f) Coordinate with energy suppliers to support emergency restoration of disrupted services.
g) Provide accurate information to release to the public through the Public Information Officer.
h) Facilitate the Operational Area Planning Group